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Abstract
Link prediction is one of the fundamental research
problems in network analysis. Intuitively, it involves
identifying the edges that are most likely to be added
to a given network, or the edges that appear to
be missing from the network when in fact they are
present. Various algorithms have been proposed to
solve this problem over the past decades. For all
their benefits, such algorithms raise serious privacy
concerns, as they could be used to expose a connec-
tion between two individuals who wish to keep their
relationship private. With this in mind, we inves-
tigate the ability of such individuals to evade link
prediction algorithms. More precisely, we study their
ability to strategically alter their connections so as
to increase the probability that some of their con-
nections remain unidentified by link prediction algo-
rithms. We formalize this question as an optimiza-
tion problem, and prove that finding an optimal solu-
tion is NP-complete. Despite this hardness, we show
that the situation is not bleak in practice. In par-
ticular, we propose two heuristics that can easily be
applied by members of the general public on exist-
ing social media. We demonstrate the effectiveness
of those heuristics on a wide variety of networks and
against a plethora of link prediction algorithms.
Introduction
The Internet and social media have fueled enormous
interest in developing new social network analysis
tools [40]. With such tools, data about our social con-
nections, email exchanges, and even financial trans-
actions may all be analysed to infer personal infor-
mation that would otherwise remain confidential [6].
This raises both privacy and security related concerns
as our data may be valueable not only to enterprises
and public entities, but also to cyber criminals who
are increasingly relying on network analysis tools for
malicious purposes [4].
One of the main network analysis tools is link pre-
diction [30, 32]. Intuitively, based on the current net-
work topology, this problem involves predicting the
connections that are most likely to form in the fu-
ture [30]. An alternative interpretation of this prob-
lem is to identify the connections that are hidden
from an observer, either due to data scarcity, or due
to the deliberate concealment of information [8]. Link
prediction has numerous applications, from providing
recommendations to customers in e-commerce [13],
through discovering the interactions between proteins
in biological networks [10], to finding hidden connec-
tions between terrorists [2] or criminals [43].
A plethora of different link prediction algorithms
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have been proposed in the literature [30, 32, 3]. We
focus in this article on the mainstream class of link-
prediction algorithms based on similarity indices [32]
which analyse the network topology to quantify the
similarity between any two disconnected nodes in
that network. The underlying assumption in this
class of algorithms is that the greater the similar-
ity between two nodes, the greater the likelihood of
having a link between them.
If used with malicious intent, link prediction algo-
rithms may constitute a serious threat to both the
privacy and the security of the general public. In
particular, inspired by the saying “tell me who your
friends are and I’ll tell you who are”, a network anal-
yser may use link-prediction algorithms to perform a
link reconstruction attack [16], which not only reveals
your undisclosed “friends”, but may also enhance the
severity of the more general attribute inference attack
[27] whereby the goal is to infer various private infor-
mation about “who you are” [47, 35].
Driven by these concerns, a number of studies rec-
ommended that social media users conceal some of
their attributes, and especially their connections [31,
21]. Nevertheless, although the literature identified a
variety of reasons why one should conceal his or her
private connections, unfortunately far less attention
has been paid to how this should be done.
Driven by these observations, we study settings in
which a “seeker” runs link-prediction algorithms, and
“evaders” wish to hide some of their connections by
making them harder to identify. More specifically,
we focus on two questions: (i) how may individuals
effectively evade such algorithms by rewiring the con-
nections within their neighbourhood? and (ii) how do
such evasion efforts influence the network structure?
Since, from a graph-theoretic perspective, the prob-
lem of evading link prediction is in essence an opti-
mization problem, we analyse its computational com-
plexity to illuminate the theoretical limits of evading
link-prediction algorithms. We prove that an optimal
solution is hard to compute given nine link-prediction
algorithms that are widely studied in the literature.
Based on this finding, we move our attention towards
identifying effective, albeit not optimal, solutions. To
this end, we propose two alternative heuristics that
can easily be implemented by members of the general
public on existing social media platforms. The first
heuristic removes strategically-chosen links from the
network, and another that adds new ones. We show
that both heuristics are effective in practice, although
the former seems more effective than the latter, sug-
gesting that in order to hide a relationship, “unfriend-
ing” carefully-chosen individuals can provide a better
disguise than befriending new ones. Finally, we eval-
uate the attack tolerance of different link-prediction
algorithms, and find that their resilience tends to in-
crease with the number of nodes, and tends to de-
crease with the average degree in the network.
Results
Theoretical Analysis
Given an undirected network, G = (V,E), where V is
the set of nodes and E is the set of edges, we will use
the term “non-edge” to refer to any pair of nodes that
is not in E, and will denote the set of all non-edges by
E¯. Our problem of evading link prediction involves a
seeker who ranks all non-edges based on a similarity
index (Section S1), and identifies the highly-ranked
ones as edges that are likely to be part of the network,
or likely to form in the future. An evader, on the
other hand, has a set of undeclared relationships that
he or she wishes to keep private; the fact that these
relationships are undeclared means that they are non-
edges as far as the seeker is concerned, and we will
model them as such. The evader’s goal is then to
rewire the network in order to minimize the likelihood
of those non-edges being highlighted by the seeker.
Note that a non-edge becomes less exposed to the
seeker if it drops in the similarity-based ranking of all
non-edges. To quantify the degree to which a non-
edge is exposed in any such a ranking, we use two
alternative measures, namely the area under the ROC
curve (AUC ) [15] and the average precision (AP) [7]
(Section S2). Our problem is then formally defined
as follows:
Definition 1 (Evading Link Prediction). This prob-
lem is defined by a tuple, (G, sG, f,H, b, Â, R̂), where
G = (V,E) is a network, sG : E¯ → R is a similarity
index, f ∈ {AUC ,AP} is a performance evaluation
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metric, H ⊂ E¯ is the set of non-edges to be hidden,
b ∈ N is a budget specifying the maximum number of
edges that can be modified (i.e., added or removed),
Â ⊆ E¯ \H is the set of edges that can be added, and
R̂ ⊆ E is the set of edges that can be removed. The
goal is then to identify two sets, A∗ ⊆ Â and R∗ ⊆ R̂,
such that the resulting set, E∗ = (E ∪A∗)\R∗, is in:
arg min
E′∈
{
(E∪A)\R : A⊆Â, R⊆R̂, |A|+|R|≤b
} f(E′, H, sG).
In this definition, we introduced the budget b as
well as the sets Â and R̂ to model scenarios in which
the evader’s ability to modify the network is limited.
The following theorem implies that, given a budget
specifying the number of permitted network modifi-
cations, it is extremely challenging to identify an op-
timal way to spend this budget in order to best hide
a given set of non-edges; see the proof in Section S3.
Theorem 1. The problem of Evading Link Predic-
tion is NP-complete for each of the following simi-
larity indices: Common Neighbours [37], Salton [39],
Jaccard [22], Sørensen [42], Hub Promoted [38], Hub
Depressed [38], Leicht-Holme-Newman [28], Adamic-
Adar [1] and Resource Allocation [48].
To put it differently, given any of the indices
outlined in Theorem 1, the theorem implies that
the problem of evading link prediction is at least
as hard as any of the problems in the class NP
(Non-deterministic Polynomial-time), implying that
no known algorithm can solve it in polynomial time.
Despite this hardness, the situation is not necessarily
bleak, especially in situations where a reasonable, al-
beit not optimal, solution would suffice. With this in
mind, we will present two heuristic algorithms that
run in polynomial time; the first, called CTR, focuses
on removing edges whereas the second, called OTC,
focuses on adding edges.
The CTR Heuristic
Our first heuristic, called CTR (which stands for
Closed-Triad-Removal) works by selecting an edge,
(v, w) ∈ E, such that:
∃x ∈ V : ((v, x) ∈ E) ∧ ((x,w) ∈ H),
which implies that (v, x), (x,w) and (v, w) form a
closed triad. The algorithm then removes (v, w) from
the network, thereby removing the closed triad whose
nodes are v, w and x; hence the name Closed-Triad-
Removal (CTR); see the pseudo-code in Section S5
(although v, w and x form a closed triad, this is
initially unknown to the seeker since (x,w) is un-
declared, i.e., it is a non-edge as far as the seeker is
concerned). Importantly, the removal of (v, w) can
only decrease the similarity score of (x,w) according
to any of the similarity indices outlined in Theorem 1;
see the analysis in Materials and Methods. The al-
gorithm can be even more effective if the removal of
(v, w) results in the removal of multiple closed tri-
ads, each containing a non-edge in H. In Figure 1
for example, the removal of (v, w) decreases the sim-
ilarity scores of not one, but three non-edges in H,
namely (x,w), (w, y) and (w, z). Based on this ob-
servation, the CTR heuristic is designed to maximize
the number of such non-edges, by examining all pos-
sible choices of (v, w) and selecting one that affects
the greatest number of edges in H.
CTR can readily be applied by members of the
general public on existing social media platforms. In
Figure 1 for example, if w wishes to hide his or her
relationships with x, y, and z, then CTR simply re-
quires w to “unfriend” as many people as possible
who are friends of x, y and z. This can easily be
applied on Facebook for instance, since the mutual
friends of a person and any of his or her friends are
always visible.
The OTC Heuristic
Our second heuristic, called OTC (which stands for
Open-Triad-Creation) works by adding edges to the
network, unlike CTR which worked by removing
edges. Generally speaking, OTC “hides” a non-edge,
e ∈ H, by decreasing the similarity score of e while
at the same time increasing the similarity scores of
(some of) the non-edges that fall within the neigh-
bourhood of e. This, in turn, decreases the position
of e in the similarity-based ranking of all non-edges,
thereby reducing the likelihood of e being highlighted
by a seeker armed with a link-prediction algorithm.
To achieve this goal, OTC rewires the network as il-
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Figure 1: An illustration of the main idea behind the
CTR heuristic. Here, by removing (v, w), we remove
from the network three closed triads: one containing
the nodes v, w, x, another containing v, w, y, and a
third containing v, w, z. Consequently, the similarity
scores of (x,w), (w, y) and (w, z) can only decrease
based on the analysis in Materials and Methods.
lustrated in Figure 2. More formally, it selects a non-
edge (v, w) to be added to the network such that:
• ∃u ∈ V : (w, u) ∈ H;
• ∃x ∈ V :((x, v) ∈ E) ∧ ((x,w) ∈ E¯ \H).
As shown in Figure 2, the addition of (v, w) creates
open triads–one containing x, v, w and another con-
taining v, w, y—hence the name Open-Triad-Creation
(OTC). Importantly, given the similarity indices out-
lined in Theorem 1, the addition of (v, w) in Figure 2
can only decrease the similarity score of (w, u) and
can only increase that of (x,w) and (y, v); see Mate-
rials and Methods for a more formal analysis. More
generally, since the creation of an open triad can only
increase the similarity score of the non-edge therein,
the more open triads we create by adding (v, w) the
better, since this may increase the similarity scores
of a greater number of non-edges, all of which con-
tribute towards reducing the position of (w, u) in the
similarity-based ranking of all non-edges. Based on
this observation, OTC examines all possible choices
of (v, w), and selects one that results in the greatest
reduction in the ranking of the non-edges in H; see
the pseudo-code in Section S6.
OTC can be applied on popular social media plat-
forms in a straightforward manner. For instance, if u
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Figure 2: An illustration of the main idea behind the
OTC heuristic. Here, the addition of (v, w) creates
two open triads: one contains the nodes x, v, w; the
other contains v, w, y. Consequently, the similarity
scores of (x,w) and (y, v) increase while that of (w, u)
decreases; see the analysis in Materials and Methods.
and w wish to hide their relationship, then any one
of them, say w, can send friendship requests to in-
dividuals whose list of friends contains as many peo-
ple as possible who are not connected to w. Even
if such individuals are hard to find, one can still
send random friendship requests to highly-connected
strangers, hoping that some of them would accept
the request. This is indeed plausible, as an estimated
55% of people accept friendship requests from com-
plete strangers on Facebook [36].
Simulation Results
A typical and intuitive way to evaluate a similarity
index is as follows. First, the links of the network
are divided into a training set, T , and a probe set,
Q. The index trains on T and assigns a similarity
score to every pair of nodes accordingly. Those scores
are then evaluated based on the area under the ROC
curve (AUC ) [15], which can be interpreted as the
probability that the index assigns a greater score to
a random link in Q than to a random non-edge; see
Section S2 for more details. With this in mind, we
evaluate the effectiveness of each heuristic against a
similarity index in a given network as follows: we run
the heuristic iteratively, and after each iteration, we
compute AUC given a training set consisting of every
link in the network and a probe set consisting of every
link in H; this way we can assess the probability that
the index assigns a greater score to a random link in
4
H than to a random non-edge. Figure 3 depicts the
results in three networks given the similarity indices
outlined in Theorem 1. As can be seen, both heuris-
tics are able to reduce AUC and thus hide the links
in H, although CTR seems more effective than OTC,
suggesting that in order to hide a relationship, “un-
friending” carefully-chosen individuals can provide a
better disguise than befriending new ones. Similar
trends where observed when replacing AUC with a
different performance metric—the average precision
(AP) [7]—and when experimenting with other net-
works and similarity indices; see Section S8.
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Figure 3: For each of the similarity indices outlined
in Theorem 1, the figure depicts AUC during the
execution of OTC and CTR given different networks,
where |H| = max(10, |E|/100) and b = 4|H|, and the
links in H are chosen at random. Results are taken as
the average over 50 executions, with coloured areas
representing the 95% confidence intervals.
Next, we evaluate the attack tolerance of the sim-
ilarity indices outlined in Theorem 1 based on two
performance metrics—AUC and AP—while varying
the number of nodes, n, and the average degree, d, in
scale-free networks; see Figure 4. Overall, the attack
tolerance of those similarity indices tends to increase
with n (especially in terms of AUC ) and decreases
with d (especially when facing CTR). Similar trends
were observed when experimenting with Small-World
networks and Erdos-Renyi random graphs; see Sec-
tion S8.3.
Finally, we consider a practical scenario that could
be faced by any individual whose goal is to hide just
a single relationship using only 10 modifications in a
massive telecommunication network. To this end, we
consider a network consisting of all 829, 725 phone
calls between the 248, 763 users of a particular Euro-
pean telecom operator who live in 4 geographically
continuous districts [34]. Figure 5 depicts the re-
sults for OTC (which adds edges) and CTR (which
removes edges), and also shows what happens when
the budget is split between the two heuristics (by al-
ternating between adding and removing edges). As
can be seen, CTR is effective in terms of both AP
and AUC . In contrast, OTC is less effective in terms
of AP , and not effective at all in terms of AUC .
Mixing the two heuristics does not seem to produce
any synergistic effects. Similar trends were observed
when considering just 1 instead of 4 districts; see Sec-
tion S8.4.
Materials and Methods
Analyzing CTR and OTC
Let NG(v) denote the set of neighbours of node v,
i.e., NG(v) = {w ∈ V : (v, w) ∈ E}, and let NG(v, w)
denote the set of common neighbours of v and w, i.e.,
NG(v, w) = NG(v) ∩NG(w). The degree of v will be
denoted by dG(v), i.e., dG(v) = |NG(v)|. Whenever
it is clear from the context, we will omit the graph
subscript, e.g., by writing N(v) instead of NG(v).
Now, let S denote the set of all the similarity indices
outlined in Theorem 1; the formula for each of these
indices is specified in Section S1. Looking at these
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Figure 4: Evaluating the attack tolerance of the sim-
ilarity indices outlined in Theorem 1 against OTC
(which adds edges) and CTR (which removes edges)
in scale-free networks while varying the number of
nodes, n = 200, 400, . . . , 1000, and the average de-
gree, d = 2, 4, . . . , 10. Here, attack tolerance is mea-
sured in terms of the relative change in AUC and AP .
For each n, we report the average over different val-
ues of d. Likewise, for each d, we report the average
over different values of n. The links in H are chosen
at random, where |H| = 100 and b = 4|H|. Each ex-
periment is repeated 50 times, and the figure depicts
the average result with coloured areas representing
the 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 5: Given the similarity indices outlined in
Theorem 1 and a telecommunication network consist-
ing of 248, 763 nodes and 829, 725 edges, the figure
depicts the average AUC and AP during the execu-
tion of OTC and CTR given a budget b = 10, where
H contains just a single link. More specifically, for
each similarity index, we consider the 1, 000 highest-
ranked links, and for each such link, (v, u), we run
the heuristic once where the evader is v and another
where the evader is u. This entire process is repeated
10 times, and the average results are reported with
the coloured areas representing the 95% confidence
intervals.
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formulae, one can see that the similarity score of ev-
ery non-edge, (x,w) ∈ E¯, depends solely on (some
of) the following factors:
• Factor 1: the number of common neighbours of
the non-edge. More specifically, for every s ∈ S,
the score s(x,w) increases with |N(x,w)|.
• Factor 2: the degree of each end of the non-edge,
but only if both ends have some common neigh-
bours. Specifically, for every similarity index,
s ∈ S \ {sCN, sAA, sRA}, the score s(x,w) de-
creases with d(x) and with d(w) if N(x,w) 6= ∅.1
Otherwise, if N(x,w) = ∅, then s(x,w) is not af-
fected by d(x) nor by d(w). As for the remaining
similarity indices, i.e., those in {sCN, sAA, sRA},
their scores are not affected by d(x) nor by d(w),
regardless of whether N(x,w) = ∅.
• Factor 3: the degree of every common neigh-
bour of the non-edge. More specifically, for every
similarity index s ∈ {sAA, sRA} and every com-
mon neighbour v ∈ N(x,w), the score s(x,w)
decreases with d(v). As for the remaining simi-
larity indices, i.e., those in S \ {sAA, sRA}, their
scores are not affected by any d(v) : v ∈ N(x,w).
Therefore, the addition of an edge, (v, w), can only
affect the scores of the following types of non-edges:
• Type 1: (x,w) : x ∈ N(v) \ N(w). Such a non-
edge is affected by the addition of (v, w), which
adds v to N(x,w), thereby increasing |N(x,w)|.
This, in turn, increases s(x,w) for every similar-
ity index s ∈ S; see Factor 1.
• Type 2: (x,w) : N(x,w) 6= ∅. Such a non-edge is
affected by the addition of (v, w), which increases
d(w). This, in turn, decreases s(x,w) for every
s ∈ S \ {sCN, sAA, sRA}; see Factor 2.
• Type 3: (x, y) : x, y ∈ N(w). Such a non-edge is
affected by the addition of (v, w), which increases
the degree of a common neighbour of x and y,
namely w. This, in turn, decreases s(x, y) for
every s ∈ {sAA, sRA}; see Factor 3.
1The Jaccard index [22], sJac, is affected by d(x) and d(w),
since: |N(x) ∪N(w)| = d(x) + d(w)− |N(x,w)|.
Note that a non-edge (x, v) can be of both Type 1
and Type 2 simultaneously; this happens when x ∈
N(w)\N(v) and N(x, v) 6= ∅. In this case, (x, v) is af-
fected by Factor 1 —which increases s(x, v)—as well
as Factor 2 —which decreases s(x, v). Since these two
factor have opposite effects, whether s(x, v) increases
depends on whether the effect of Factor 1 outweighs
that of Factor 2.
Finally, note that the impact of removing (v, w) is
exactly the opposite to that of adding (v, w). For in-
stance, suppose that (v, x) is a non-edge of Type 1
and not of Type 2. Then, by adding (v, w) to a net-
work (V,E) : (v, w) 6∈ E, we increase s(v, x) for every
s ∈ S. In contrast, by removing (v, w) from a net-
work (V,E) : (v, w) ∈ E, we decrease s(v, x).
With these observations in mind, let us analyse
our heuristics, starting with CTR. Recall that this
heuristic removes an edge, (v, w) ∈ E, where:
∃x ∈ V : ((v, x) ∈ E) ∧ ((x,w) ∈ H).
Importantly, by removing (v, w):
• the node v is removed from the common neigh-
bours of w and x, thereby reducing |N(x,w)|. As
a result, the similarity score of (x,w) decreases
according to Factor 1.
• the degree of node w decreases. As a result, the
similarity score of (x,w) can only increase ac-
cording to Factor 2.
To put it differently, by removing (v, w), the sim-
ilarity score of (x,w) is subjected to two opposing
forces; one that decreases it, and another that in-
creases it, Nevertheless, the following theorem im-
plies that the latter force never outweighs the former
one. In other words, by removing (v, w), the similar-
ity score of (x,w) can only decrease given the simi-
larity indices in S; see the proof in Section S4.
Theorem 2. Let G′ = (V,E′) be a network, and let
(x,w) be a non-edge in G′. Furthermore, let v be a
node in G′ such that v ∈ NG′(x) and v 6∈ NG′(w).
Finally, let G be the network that results from adding
(v, w) to G′, i.e., G = (V,E) where E = E′∪{(v, w)}.
Then, for every similarity index, s ∈ S, we have:
sG′(x,w) ≤ sG(x,w)
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Moving on to OTC, recall that this heuristic adds
to the network a non-edge (v, w) such that, after the
addition of (v, w):
• ∃u ∈ V : (w, u) ∈ H;
• ∃x ∈ V :({(x, v), (v, w)} ⊆ E)∧((x,w) ∈ E¯\H).
Based on this, by adding (v, w):
• the degree of w increases, which can only de-
crease the similarity score of (w, u) according to
Factor 2.
• the similarity scores of (x,w) and (y, v) can only
increase according to Theorem 2.
Thus, given the similarity indices in S, the addition
of (v, w) can only decrease the position of (w, u) in
the similarity-based ranking of all non-edges.
Conclusion
We studied the attack tolerance of link prediction al-
gorithms when an individual is strategically rewiring
the network to hide some of his/her relations. We an-
alyzed the corresponding optimization problem, and
showed that an optimal solution is hard to compute.
Based on this finding, we focused our attention on
developing two heuristics, called OTC (which adds
edges) and CTR (which removes edges). Both heuris-
tics can readily be executed by lay people on exist-
ing social media platforms, without requiring exten-
sive computational power nor full knowledge of the
entire network topology. Our empirical evaluation
showed that both heuristics are effective in practice,
although CTR seems more effective than OTC, sug-
gesting that in order to hide a relationship, “unfriend-
ing” carefully-chosen individuals can provide a better
disguise than befriending new ones. Next, we evalu-
ated the attack tolerance of various similarity indices
while varying the number of nodes, n, and the average
degree, d. We found that the attack tolerance of these
indices tends to increase with n and decreases with
d. Finally, we consider a practical scenario where the
goal is to hide a single relation in a massive telecom-
munication network. In this scenario, we found that
OTC has no impact according to a certain perfor-
mance measure, unlike CTR.
Our study demonstrates the fragility of existing
link prediction algorithms in the face of a strategic
evader, and highlights the need to develop new algo-
rithms that are harder to fool.
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Organization of the Appendix
This document is structured as follows:
• Section A (page 12) presents link prediction algorithms;
• Section B (page 14) presents performance evaluation metrics;
• Section C (page 16) presents the proof of Theorem 1;
• Section D (page 27) presents the proof of Theorem 2;
• Section E (page 29) presents the pseudocode of CTR;
• Section F (page 31) presents the pseudocode of OTC;
• Section G (page 33) illustrates the workings of CTR on the 9/11 terrorist network;
• Section H (page 34) evaluates the effectiveness of CTR and OTC. More specifically:
– Section H.1 (page 34) describes the networks considered in our experiments;
– Section H.2 (page 35) evaluates our heuristics against local similarity indices;
– Section H.3 (page 41) evaluates our heuristics against global similarity indices;
– Section H.4 (page 47) presents results for a practical telecommunications scenario;
• Section I (page 48) empirically evaluates the runtime of both heuristics;
• Section J (page 49) evaluates the attack tolerance of different similarity indices.
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A Link Prediction Algorithms
For any network, and any pair of nodes that are not connected in that network, a link prediction algorithm
estimates the likelihood that there exists a not-yet-discovered edge between those two nodes, or that an
edge will form between the two nodes in the future [18]. Many link prediction algorithms are based on
similarity indices, also known as kernels [41]. Formally, given a network, G = (V,E), a similarity index is a
function, sG : E¯ → R, that assigns to each non-edge (v, w) ∈ E¯ a score indicating the probability of (v, w)
forming in the future, or the probability of (v, w) being a not-yet-discovered edge in the network [18]. For
any similarity index, sG, and any non-edge, (v, w) ∈ E¯, we will often write sG(v, w) instead of sG((v, w)) to
improve readability, and we will omit the graph subscript when it is clear from the context. Furthermore,
following common practice in the literature, we will not consider self-loops, i.e., edges or non-edges of the
form (v, v) : v ∈ V .
A.1 Local Similarity Indices
An important class of link prediction algorithms are those based on local similarity indices, i.e., indices that
account for only local information pertaining to the non-edge in question. As such, the algorithms based on
local similarity indices are typically computationally tractable and can be used even with massive networks.
In our study, we consider the following local similarity indices, taken from the survey by Lu¨ and Zhou [32]:2
• Common Neighbours [37]: sCN(v, w) = |N(v, w)|
• Salton [39]: sSal(v, w) = |N(v,w)|√
d(v)d(w)
• Jaccard [22]: sJac(v, w) = |N(v,w)||N(v)∪N(w)|
• Sørensen [42]: sSør(v, w) = 2|N(v,w)|d(v)+d(w)
• Hub Promoted [38]: sHPI(v, w) = |N(v,w)|min(d(v),d(w))
• Hub Depressed [38]: sHDI(v, w) = |N(v,w)|max(d(v),d(w))
• Leicht-Holme-Newman [28]: sLHN(v, w) = |N(v,w)|d(v)d(w)
• Adamic-Adar [1]: sAA(v, w) = ∑
u∈N(v,w)
1
log(d(u))
• Resource Allocation [48]: sRA(v, w) = ∑
u∈N(v,w)
1
d(u)
The set consisting of all those similarity indices will be denoted by S. More formally:
S = {sCN, sSal, sJac, sSør, sHPI, sHDI, sLHN, sAA, sRA}.
2The only local similarity index in [32] that is excluded from our analysis is the Preferential Attachment Index. Unlike the
other indices in [32], the Preferential Attachment index is based on the assumption that the degree distribution follows a power
law—an assumption that does not hold for many of the networks on which we conduct our experiments.
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A.2 Global Similarity Indices
Another important class of link prediction algorithms are those categorized by Lu¨ and Zhou [32] as global
similarity indices. Before presenting those indices, we need to introduce some additional notation. Let A
denote the adjacency matrix of a network, let λ∗ denote the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix, let
L+ denote the pseudoinverse of the Laplacian matrix, and let I denote a unit matrix. Now, for any global
similarity index, s, let S denote the corresponding similarity matrix, whereby the similarity of any pair of
nodes, vi, vj ∈ V , is specified at the i-th row and j-th column of S. More formally, ∀vi, vj ∈ V, s(vi, vj) = Si,j .
With this notation in place, we can now present the global similarity indices outlined in [32]:
• Katz [24] is based on the number of paths between the two nodes, where longer paths are taken with
lesser weight according to the dampening factor. Formally, the similarity matrix of this index is:
SKatz = (I − βA)−1 − I,
where β is the dampening factor. In our experiments we set β = 12λ∗ , as the value has to be smaller
than the reciprocal of the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix.
• Leicht-Holme-Newman Global [28] is based on the idea that two nodes are similar if their neighbourhoods
are similar. More formally, the similarity matrix of this index is:
SLHNG = 2|E|λ∗D−1(I − φA
λ∗
)−1D−1,
where D is the degree matrix, i.e., a diagonal matrix where Di,i = d(vi), and φ is a free parameter. In
our experiments we set φ = 97100 , as in the original article.
• Average Commute Time [19] is based on the assumption that two nodes are more similar if a random
walker can travel between them in a shorter average time. Formally, it is defined as follows:
sACT(vi, vj) =
1
L+i,i + L
+
j,j − 2L+i,j
.
• Cosine [17] is based on the cosine of the angle between the vectors representing the two nodes. More
formally, it is defined as follows:
sCos(vi, vj) =
L+i,j√
L+i,iL
+
j,j
.
• Random Walk with Restart [9] is based on the idea that node vi is more similar to node vj if node vi
is visited with higher frequency by a random walker who starts at node vj and iteratively moves to a
random neighbor with probability c and returns to node vj with probability 1− c. Formally, this index
is defined as follows:
sRWR(vi, vj) = Qi,j +Qj,i,
with matrix Q being:
Q = (1− c)(I − cPT )−1,
where P is the transition matrix: Pi,j =
1
d(vi)
if vj ∈ N(vi) and Pi,j = 0 otherwise. In our experiments
we set c = 34 .
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• SimRank [23] is based on the idea that two nodes are more similar if two random walkers starting at
those nodes are expected to meet faster. This index can be computed iteratively as follows:
sSR(vi, vj) =
c
∑
v∈N(vi)
∑
w∈N(vj) s
SR(v, w)
d(vi)d(vj)
,
where ∀v ∈ V sSR(v, v) = 1 and c is the decay factor. In our experiments we set c = 810 .
• Matrix Forest Index [11] assumes that two nodes are more similar if there is a higher probability that
they belong to the same tree in a spanning rooted forest. Formally, the similarity matrix of this index
is defined as follows:
SMFI = (I + L)−1,
where L is the Laplacian matrix.
B Performance Evaluation Metrics
Arguably, the most common metrics for evaluating the performance of a similarity index are: Area under
the ROC curve (AUC ) [15] and Area under the Precision-Recall curve (PR) [33]. To compute any of these
metrics for a given similarity index, s, we are given a training set, E, and a probe set, Q, such that E∩Q = ∅,
i.e., Q ⊂ E¯. The probe set Q is considered the correct solution of link prediction, i.e., similarity indices are
expected to assign high scores to non-edges from Q. The network (V,E) serves as input to the similarity
index, s, which produces a ranking of the elements of E¯. One can express the quality of this ranking using
either AUC or PR. To explain how these metrics are computed, we need some additional notation. Let σk
denote the top k elements of E¯ when ranked according to s, and let X = E¯ \Q. Next, we explain how AUC
or PR are computed, and then explain an alternative metric called average precision (AP).
Area under the ROC curve (AUC ): For any given E and Q, AUC (E,Q, s) is the area under the plot
consisting of the following points: {( |σk ∩X|
|X| ,
|σk ∩Q|
|Q|
)}|E¯|
k=1
AUC (E,Q) can be interpreted as the probability that the similarity index, s, assigns a greater score to a
randomly chosen non-edge from Q than to a randomly chosen non-edge from X (ties broken at random),
i.e.:
AUC (E,Q, s) =
|{(e1, e2) ∈ Q×X : s(e1) > s(e2)}|+ 12 |{(e1, e2) ∈ Q×X : s(e1) = s(e2)}|
|Q||X| .
Area under the Precision-Recall curve (PR): For any given E and Q, PR(E,Q, s) is the area under
the plot consisting of the following points:{( |σk ∩Q|
|Q| ,
|σk ∩Q|
k
)}|E¯|
k=1
Average precision (AP): Since the PR value is not well-defined for plots that are not continuous, we
use instead the average precision, AP , described by Boyd et al. [7] as one of the most robust estimators of
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the area under the Precision-Recall curve. Taking into account the possibility of equal scores, the average
precision value is computed as follows:
AP(E,Q, s) =
1
|Q|
∑
ê∈Q
|{e ∈ Q : s(e) > s(ê)}|+ 1 + 12 |{e ∈ Q \ {ê} : s(e) = s(ê)}|
|{e ∈ E¯ : s(e) > s(ê)}|+ 1 + 12 |{e ∈ E¯ \ {ê} : s(e) = s(ê)}|
.
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C Proof of Theorem 1
We will prove that the problem of Evading Link Prediction is NP-complete for all the similarity indices
described in Section A.1, and that is for both the AUC and AP metrics which were described in Section B.
To this end, we need to first define a certain network, which we denote by Γ(c, P ); this network will be used
later on in our proofs.
Definition 2 (The Γ(c, P ) Network). Let U = {u1, . . . , um} be a set of m elements, and let P = {P1, . . . , Pq}
be a cover of U containing q subsets that are each smaller than U . That is, ∀iPi ⊂ U and
⋃
Pi∈P Pi = U .
Then, given a constant, c ∈ N, the network Γ(c, P ) is created as follows:
• The set of nodes:: For every Pi ∈ P , we create a single node, denoted by Pi. Moreover, for every
ui ∈ {u0, . . . , um}, we create a node denoted by ui, as well as c nodes denoted by ai,1, . . . , ai,c, and
q − |P (ui)| nodes denoted by di,1, . . . , di,q−|P (ui)|, where P (ui) = {Pj ∈ P : ui ∈ Pj}. Additionally, we
create three nodes, v0, v1, and u0, as well as c nodes, a0,1, . . . , a0,c, and q nodes, d0,1, . . . , d0,q.
• The set of edges: For every Pj ∈ P we create the edge (Pj , v1), as well as the edges (Pj , ui) for every
ui ∈ Pj. Moreover, for every ui ∈ U we create the edge (ui, v1), as well as the edges (ui, uj) for every
uj ∈ {ui+1, . . . , um} (this way, the nodes in {u0, . . . , um} form an (m + 1)-clique). Furthermore, for
every di,j we create the edges (di,j , ui) and (di,j , v1). Finally, for every ai,j we create the edges (ai,j , ui),
(ai,j , v0) and (ai,j , v1).
...
...
𝑃𝑞
𝑃2
𝑃1
𝑣0
𝑣1
𝑎0,1
𝑎1,1
𝑎1,𝑐
𝑎𝑚,1
𝑎𝑚,𝑐
...
...
...
𝑢0
...
𝑑0,1
𝑑0,𝑞
𝑢1
𝑑1,1
𝑑1,𝑞−|𝑃(𝑢1)|
...
𝑑𝑚,1
𝑢𝑚
...
𝑑𝑚,𝑞−|𝑃(𝑢𝑚)|
𝑎0,𝑐
...
Figure 6: An illustration of the Γ(c, P ) network. Edges connecting v1 with other nodes are grayed out to
improve readability. The red non-edge, (u0, v0), is the one to be hidden.
An illustration of the Γ(c, P ) network is provided in Figure 6. Now, suppose that we want to hide a particular
non-edge in this network, which is (u0, v0). Suppose further that, in order to hide (u0, v0), we were only
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allowed to add edges of the form (Pi, v0). Then, for any given similarity index, s ∈ S, we need to understand
how the addition of those (Pi, v0) edges affects the position of s(u0, v0) in the similarity-based ranking of
all non-edges; if the position of s(u0, v0) decreases in this ranking, then (u0, v0) becomes more hidden. The
following lemma implies that for every similarity index in S there exists some constant, c ∈ N, such that the
position of s(u0, v0) decreases if we add edges of the form (Pi, v0) to the network Γ(c, P ).
Lemma 1. Consider a network (V,E) = Γ(c, P ) for which m ≥ 5 and |Pi| = 3 for all Pi ∈ P . Furthermore,
let Â = {(Pi, v0) : Pi ∈ P}, and for every A ⊆ Â let PA = {Pi ∈ P : (Pi, v0) ∈ A}, and let PA(uj) = {Pi ∈
PA : uj ∈ Pi}. Then, for every A ⊆ Â, and every similarity index, s ∈ S, there exists some constant, c ∈ N,
such that:
(a) for every non-edge of the form (ui, v0) : i ∈ {0, . . . ,m}, we have:
• s(ui, v0) = s(u0, v0) in the network (V,E).
• s(ui, v0) = s(u0, v0) in the network (V,E ∪A) if PA(ui) = ∅.
• s(ui, v0) > s(u0, v0) in the network (V,E ∪A) if PA(ui) 6= ∅.
(b) for every non-edge of the form (Pi, v0) : i ∈ {0, . . . , q}, we have:
• s(Pi, v0) < s(u0, v0) in the network (V,E).
• s(Pi, v0) < s(u0, v0) in the network (V,E ∪A) if (Pi, v0) /∈ A.3
(c) for every other non-edge, e ∈ E¯ \ {(u0, v0), . . . , (um, v0), (P1, v0), . . . , (Pq, v0)}:
• if s(e) > s(u0, v0) in network (V,E), then we also have s(e) > s(u0, v0) in network (V,E ∪A).
• if s(e) = s(u0, v0) in network (V,E), then we also have s(e) = s(u0, v0) in network (V,E ∪A).
• if s(e) < s(u0, v0) in network (V,E), then we also have s(e) < s(u0, v0) in network (V,E ∪A).
Before we prove the correctness of Lemma 1, let us first provide an example. Suppose that U = {u1, . . . , u7},
and P = {P1, P2, P3} where P1 = {u1, u2, u3}, P2 = {u3, u4, u5} and P3 = {u5, u6, u7}. Then:
• The set Â consist of every edge of the form (Pi, v0). That is, Â = {(P1, v0), (P2, v0), (P3, v0)}. Note
that none of the edges in Â appear in the network (V,E) = Γ(c, P ).
• The set A is a subset of Â. Suppose that A = {(P2, v0), (P3, v0)}. Then:
– PA consists of every Pi that appears in A, i.e., PA = {P2, P3};
– PA(ui) consists of every Pi that contains ui and appears in PA. For instance, we have: PA(u1) = ∅
and PA(u5) = {P2, P3};
• Using Lemma 1, we can analyse how the similarity of the non-edges in Γ(c, P ) = (V,E) would change if
we add the edges (P2, v0) and (P3, v0). To this end, we simply set A = {(P2, v0), (P3, v0)} and analyse
the network (V,E ∪ A). Now, based on Lemma 1, we know that for every similarity index s ∈ S there
exists some constant, c ∈ N, such that:
– Based on point (a) of Lemma 1:
3Otherwise, if (Pi, v0) ∈ A, then (Pi, v0) will not be a non-edge in (V,E ∪A), and therefore we cannot compute s(Pi, v0).
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∗ for i ∈ {1, 2} we have s(ui, v0) = s(u0, v0) in (V,E) and s(ui, v0) = s(u0, v0) in (V,E ∪ A),
because PA(ui) = ∅.
∗ for i ∈ {3, . . . , 7} we have s(ui, v0) = s(u0, v0) in (V,E) and s(ui, v0) > s(u0, v0) in (V,E ∪A),
because PA(ui) 6= ∅.
– Based on point (b) of Lemma 1, we have: s(P1, v0) < s(u0, v0) both in (V,E) and in (V,E ∪ A),
since (P1, v0) 6∈ A.
– Based on point (c) of Lemma 1, for every non-edge e whose form is neither (ui, v0) nor (Pi, v0):
∗ if we had s(e) > s(u0, v0) in (V,E), then we will also have s(e) > s(u0, v0) in (V,E ∪A).
∗ if we had s(e) = s(u0, v0) in (V,E), then we will also have s(e) = s(u0, v0) in (V,E ∪A).
∗ if we had s(e) < s(u0, v0) in (V,E), then we will also have s(e) < s(u0, v0) in (V,E ∪A).
Thus, before the addition of {(P2, v0), (P3, v0)}, the position of (u0, v0) in the similarity-based ranking was
the same as that of any non-edge of the form (ui, v0). However, after the addition of {(P2, v0), (P3, v0)}, the
edge (u0, v0) has a ranking lower than that of any (ui, v0) : i ∈ {3, . . . , 7}; as for the remaining non-edges,
their relative rankings compared to that of (u0, v0) remain unchanged after the addition of {(P2, v0), (P3, v0)}.
Based on this, by adding {(P2, v0), (P3, v0)} to the network Γ(c, P ) = (V,E), we decrease the position of
s(u0, v0) in the similarity-based ranking of all non-edges, i.e., we make (u0, v0) more hidden.
Having explained Lemma 1 through an example, we will now prove the correctness of this lemma, before
presenting our main theorem.
Proof. First, note that the following holds:
• for every Pi and every network (V,E ∪ A) : A ⊆ Â where (Pi, v0) /∈ A, we have N(Pi, v0) = ∅, i.e., Pi
and v0 have no common neighbours;
• for every di,j and every network (V,E ∪A) : A ⊆ Â, we have N(v0, di,j) = ∅.
This implies that for every similarity index, s ∈ S, we have:
• for every Pi and every network (V,E ∪A) : A ⊆ Â where (Pi, v0) /∈ A, we have s(Pi, v0) = 0;
• for every di,j and every network (V,E ∪A) : A ⊆ Â, we have s(v0, di,j) = 0.
One can also verify that for every s ∈ S and every network (V,E ∪ A) : A ⊆ Â it holds that s(u0, v0) > 0.
This implies that point (b) of Lemma 1 holds, and that point (c) holds for every non-edge of the form
(v0, di,j). We still need to prove the correctness of point (a), as well as the correctness of point (c) for every
non-edge of the form:
(i) (v0, v1)
(ii) (ui, Pj) for ui /∈ Pj
(iii) (ui, aj,l) for i 6= j
(iv) (ui, dj,l) for i 6= j
(v) (Pi, Pj) for i 6= j
(vi) (Pi, aj,l)
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(vii) (Pi, dj,l)
(viii) (ai1,j1 , ai2,j2)
(ix) (ai1,j1 , di2,j2)
(x) (di1,j1 , di2,j2)
Next, for every similarity index in S, we will prove the correctness of point (a), as well as the correctness of
point (c) for each of the above types of non-edges. To this end, first note that the following holds for every
network (V,E ∪A) : A ⊆ Â and every ai,j , di,j , Pi in that network:
• d(ai,j) = 3 (because ai,j is connected to v0, v1 and ui);
• d(di,j) = 2 (because di,j is connected to v1 and ui);
• 4 ≤ d(Pi) ≤ 5 (because Pi is connected to v1 and to every uj ∈ Pi, where we assumed that |Pi| = 3;
also, if Pi ∈ A, then Pi is connected to v0).
Also note that u0 /∈ Pi for every Pi ∈ P . Therefore, for any given A ⊆ Â, we have: PA(u0) = 0. In
what follows, we will use the aforementioned facts without referring back to them. We will also use r to
denote the number of ai,j nodes, i.e., r = c(m + 1), and use h to denote the number of di,j nodes, i.e.,
h = (m+ 1)q − 3q = mq − 2q.
Common Neighbours (sCN): We choose c = 6. Then, to prove the correctness of point (a), it
suffices to note that for every network (V,E ∪A) : A ⊆ Â we have:
∀uj∈{u0,...,um}sCN(uj , v0) = 6 + |PA(uj)|.
Moving on to point (c), note that for every network (V,E ∪ A) : A ⊆ Â we have sCN(u0, v0) = 6 and that
the following holds:
(i) sCN(v0, v1) = 6(m + 1) + |A| > sCN(u0, v0), because the common neighbours of u0 and v1 are all the
nodes ai,j and all the nodes Pi where (Pi, v0) ∈ A.
(ii) sCN(ui, Pj) ≤ 4 < sCN(u0, v0), because the common neighbours of ui and Pj consist of v1 and every
ul ∈ Pj : l 6= i (note that we assumed that |Pj | = 3, and ui may or may not be an element of Pj).
(iii) sCN(ui, aj,l) = 2 < s
CN(u0, v0), because the common neighbours of ui and aj,l are v1 and uj .
(iv) sCN(ui, dj,l) = 2 < s
CN(u0, v0), because the common neighbours of ui and dj,l are v1 and uj .
(v) sCN(Pi, Pj) ≤ 5 < sCN(u0, v0), because the common neighbours of Pi and Pj consist of v1, and possibly
v0 (if {(Pi, v0), (Pj , v0)} ⊆ A), as well as the every element in Pi ∩ Pj (there can be at most 3 such
elements, since we assumed that |Pi| = |Pj | = 3, and we place no restrictions on having Pi = Pj).
(vi) sCN(Pi, aj,l) ≤ 3 < sCN(u0, v0), because the common neighbours of Pi and aj,l consist of v1, and possibly
v0 (if (Pi, v0) ∈ A) and possibly uj (if i = j).
(vii) sCN(Pi, dj,l) ≤ 2 < sCN(u0, v0), because the common neighbours of Pi and dj,l consist of v1 and possibly
uj (if i = j).
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(viii) sCN(ai1,j1 , ai2,j2) ≤ 3 < sCN(u0, v0), because the common neighbours of ai1,j1 and ai2,j2 consist of v1
and v0 and possibly ui1 (if i2 = i1).
(ix) sCN(ai1,j1 , di2,j2) ≤ 2 < sCN(u0, v0), because the common neighbours of ai1,j1 and di2,j2 consist of v1
and possibly ui1 (if i2 = i1).
(x) sCN(di1,j1 , di2,j2) ≤ 2 < sCN(u0, v0), because the common neighbours of di1,j1 and di2,j2 consist of v1
and possibly ui1 (if i2 = i1).
Salton similarity index (sSal): We choose c = 1. Then, to prove the correctness of point (a), it suffices
to note that for every network (V,E ∪A) : A ⊆ Â we have:
sSal(uj , v0) =
1 + |PA(uj)|√
(r + |A|)(m+ q + 2) , ∀uj ∈ {u0, . . . , um}.
Moving on to point (c), note that sSal(u0, v0) ≤ 1√42 (since m ≥ 5), and that the following holds for every
(V,E ∪A) : A ⊆ Â:
(i) sSal(v0, v1) =
√
r+|A|√
r+h+q+m+1
> sSal(u0, v0)
(ii) sSal(ui, Pj) ≥ 3√
(m+q+2)5
> sSal(u0, v0)
(iii) sSal(ui, aj,l) ≥ 1√
(m+q+2)3
> sSal(u0, v0)
(iv) sSal(ui, dj,l) ≥ 1√
(m+q+2)2
> sSal(u0, v0)
(v) sSal(Pi, Pj) ≥ 1√20 > sSal(u0, v0)
(vi) sSal(Pi, aj,l) ≥ 12√3 > sSal(u0, v0)
(vii) sSal(Pi, dj,l) ≥ 1√10 > sSal(u0, v0)
(viii) sSal(ai1,j1 , ai2,j2) ≥ 23 > sSal(u0, v0)
(ix) sSal(ai1,j1 , di2,j2) ≥ 1√6 > sSal(u0, v0)
(x) sSal(di1,j1 , di2,j2) ≥ 12 > sSal(u0, v0)
Jaccard similarity index (sJac): We choose c = 1. Then, to prove the correctness of point (a), it suffices
to note that for every (V,E ∪A) : A ⊆ Â we have:
sJac(uj , v0) =
1 + |PA(uj)|
r + q +m+ |A|+ 2− |PA(uj)| , ∀uj ∈ {u0, . . . , um}.
Moving on to point (c), note that sJac(u0, v0) ≤ 113 (since m ≥ 5), and that the following holds for every
(V,E ∪A) : A ⊆ Â:
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(i) sJac(v0, v1) =
r+|A|
r+h+q+m+1 > s
Jac(u0, v0)
(ii) sJac(ui, Pj) ≥ 3m+q+3 > sJac(u0, v0)
(iii) sJac(ui, aj,l) ≥ 1m+q+3 > sJac(u0, v0)
(iv) sJac(ui, dj,l) ≥ 1m+q+2 > sJac(u0, v0)
(v) sJac(Pi, Pj) ≥ 18 > sJac(u0, v0)
(vi) sJac(Pi, aj,l) ≥ 16 > sJac(u0, v0)
(vii) sJac(Pi, dj,l) ≥ 16 > sJac(u0, v0)
(viii) sJac(ai1,j1 , ai2,j2) ≥ 24 > sJac(u0, v0)
(ix) sJac(ai1,j1 , di2,j2) ≥ 14 > sJac(u0, v0)
(x) sJac(di1,j1 , di2,j2) ≥ 13 > sJac(u0, v0)
Sørensen similarity index (sSør): We choose c = 1. Then, to prove the correctness of point (a), it suffices
to note that for every (V,E ∪A) : A ⊆ Â we have:
sSør(uj , v0) =
2 + 2|PA(uj)|
r + q +m+ |A|+ 2 , ∀uj ∈ {u0, . . . , um}.
Moving on to point (c), note that sSør(u0, v0) ≤ 213 (since m ≥ 5), and that the following holds for every
(V,E ∪A) : A ⊆ Â:
(i) sSør(v0, v1) =
2r+2|A|
2r+h+q+m+1+|A| > s
Sør(u0, v0)
(ii) sSør(ui, Pj) ≥ 6m+q+7 > sSør(u0, v0)
(iii) sSør(ui, aj,l) ≥ 2m+q+5 > sSør(u0, v0)
(iv) sSør(ui, dj,l) ≥ 2m+q+4 > sSør(u0, v0)
(v) sSør(Pi, Pj) ≥ 29 > sSør(u0, v0)
(vi) sSør(Pi, aj,l) ≥ 28 > sSør(u0, v0)
(vii) sSør(Pi, dj,l) ≥ 27 > sSør(u0, v0)
(viii) sSør(ai1,j1 , ai2,j2) ≥ 46 > sSør(u0, v0)
(ix) sSør(ai1,j1 , di2,j2) ≥ 25 > sSør(u0, v0)
(x) sSør(di1,j1 , di2,j2) ≥ 24 > sSør(u0, v0)
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Hub Promoted similarity index (sHPI): We choose c = 1. Then, to prove the correctness of point (a),
it suffices to note that for every (V,E ∪A) : A ⊆ Â we have:
sHPI(uj , v0) =
1 + |PA(uj)|
r + |A| , ∀uj ∈ {u0, . . . , um}.
Moving on to point (c), note that sHPI(u0, v0) ≤ 16 (since m ≥ 5), and that the following holds for every
(V,E ∪A) : A ⊆ Â:
(i) sHPI(v0, v1) =
r+|A|
r+|A| = 1 > s
HPI(u0, v0)
(ii) sHPI(ui, Pj) ≥ 35 > sHPI(u0, v0)
(iii) sHPI(ui, aj,l) ≥ 13 > sHPI(u0, v0)
(iv) sHPI(ui, dj,l) ≥ 12 > sHPI(u0, v0)
(v) sHPI(Pi, Pj) ≥ 14 > sHPI(u0, v0)
(vi) sHPI(Pi, aj,l) ≥ 13 > sHPI(u0, v0)
(vii) sHPI(Pi, dj,l) ≥ 12 > sHPI(u0, v0)
(viii) sHPI(ai1,j1 , ai2,j2) ≥ 23 > sHPI(u0, v0)
(ix) sHPI(ai1,j1 , di2,j2) ≥ 12 > sHPI(u0, v0)
(x) sHPI(di1,j1 , di2,j2) ≥ 12 > sHPI(u0, v0)
Hub Depressed similarity index (sHDI): We choose c = 1. Then, to prove the correctness of point (a),
it suffices to note that for every (V,E ∪A) : A ⊆ Â we have:
sHDI(uj , v0) =
1 + |PA(uj)|
m+ q + 2
, ∀uj ∈ {u0, . . . , um}.
Moving on to point (c), note that sHDI(u0, v0) ≤ 17 (since m ≥ 5), and that the following holds for every
(V,E ∪A) : A ⊆ Â:
(i) sHDI(v0, v1) =
r+|A|
r+h+q+m+1 > s
HDI(u0, v0)
(ii) sHDI(ui, Pj) ≥ 3m+q+2 > sHDI(u0, v0)
(iii) Either sHDI(ui, aj,l) =
1
m+q+2 = s
HDI(u0, v0) (if i = j) or s
HDI(ui, aj,l) =
2
m+q+2 > s
HDI(u0, v0)
(otherwise)
(iv) Either sHDI(ui, dj,l) =
1
m+q+2 = s
HDI(u0, v0) (if i = j) or s
HDI(ui, dj,l) =
2
m+q+2 > s
HDI(u0, v0)
(otherwise)
(v) sHDI(Pi, Pj) ≥ 15 > sHDI(u0, v0)
(vi) sHDI(Pi, aj,l) ≥ 15 > sHDI(u0, v0)
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(vii) sHDI(Pi, dj,l) ≥ 15 > sHDI(u0, v0)
(viii) sHDI(ai1,j1 , ai2,j2) ≥ 23 > sHDI(u0, v0)
(ix) sHDI(ai1,j1 , di2,j2) ≥ 13 > sHDI(u0, v0)
(x) sHDI(di1,j1 , di2,j2) ≥ 12 > sHDI(u0, v0)
Leicht-Holme-Newman similarity index (sLHN): We choose c = 1. Then, to prove the correctness of
point (a), it suffices to note that for every (V,E ∪A) : A ⊆ Â:
sLHN(uj , v0) =
1 + |PA(uj)|
(r + |A|)(m+ q + 2) , ∀uj ∈ {u0, . . . , um}.
Moving on to point (c), note that sLHN(u0, v0) ≤ 142 (since m ≥ 5), and that the following holds for every
(V,E ∪A) : A ⊆ Â:
(i) sLHN(v0, v1) =
1
r+h+q+m+1 > s
LHN(u0, v0)
(ii) sLHN(ui, Pj) ≥ 3(m+q+2)5 > sLHN(u0, v0)
(iii) sLHN(ui, aj,l) ≥ 1(m+q+2)3 > sLHN(u0, v0)
(iv) sLHN(ui, dj,l) ≥ 1(m+q+2)2 > sLHN(u0, v0)
(v) sLHN(Pi, Pj) ≥ 120 > sLHN(u0, v0)
(vi) sLHN(Pi, aj,l) ≥ 112 > sLHN(u0, v0)
(vii) sLHN(Pi, dj,l) ≥ 110 > sLHN(u0, v0)
(viii) sLHN(ai1,j1 , ai2,j2) ≥ 29 > sLHN(u0, v0)
(ix) sLHN(ai1,j1 , di2,j2) ≥ 16 > sLHN(u0, v0)
(x) sLHN(di1,j1 , di2,j2) ≥ 14 > sLHN(u0, v0)
Adamic-Adar similarity index (sAA): We choose c = 3. Then, to prove the correctness of point (a), it
suffices to note that for every (V,E ∪A) : A ⊆ Â we have:
sAA(uj , v0) =
3
log(3)
+
|PA(uj)|
log(5)
, ∀uj ∈ {u0, . . . , um}.
Moving on to point (c), note that sAA(u0, v0) =
3
log(3) > 6 and that the following holds for every (V,E ∪A) :
A ⊆ Â:
(i) sAA(v0, v1) =
r
log(3) +
|A|
log(5) > s
AA(u0, v0)
(ii) sAA(ui, Pj) =
1
log(r+h+q+m+1) +
3
log(q+m+4) < s
AA(u0, v0)
23
(iii) sAA(ui, aj,l) ≤ 1log(r+h+q+m+1) + 1log(q+m+4) < sAA(u0, v0)
(iv) sAA(ui, dj,l) ≤ 1log(r+h+q+m+1) + 1log(q+m+4) < sAA(u0, v0)
(v) sAA(Pi, Pj) ≤ 1log(r+h+q+m+1) + 1log(r+|A|) + 3log(q+m+4) < sAA(u0, v0)
(vi) sAA(Pi, aj,l) ≤ 1log(r+h+q+m+1) + 1log(r+|A|) + 1log(q+m+4) < sAA(u0, v0)
(vii) sAA(Pi, dj,l) ≤ 1log(r+h+q+m+1) + 1log(q+m+4) < sAA(u0, v0)
(viii) sAA(ai1,j1 , ai2,j2) ≤ 1log(r+h+q+m+1) + 1log(r+|A|) + 1log(q+m+4) < sAA(u0, v0)
(ix) sAA(ai1,j1 , di2,j2) ≤ 1log(r+h+q+m+1) + 1log(q+m+4) < sAA(u0, v0)
(x) sAA(di1,j1 , di2,j2) ≤ 1log(r+h+q+m+1) + 1log(q+m+4) < sAA(u0, v0)
Resource Allocation similarity index (sRA): We choose c = 3. Then, to prove the correctness of
point (a), it suffices to note that for every (V,E ∪A) : A ⊆ Â we have:
sRA(uj , v0) =
3
3
+
|PA(uj)|
5
Moving on to point (c), note that sRA(u0, v0) = 1 and that the following holds for every (V,E ∪A) : A ⊆ Â:
(i) sRA(v0, v1) =
r
3 +
|A|
5 > s
RA(u0, v0)
(ii) sRA(ui, Pj) =
1
r+h+q+m+1 +
3
q+m+4 < s
RA(u0, v0)
(iii) sRA(ui, aj,l) ≤ 1r+h+q+m+1 + 1q+m+4 < sRA(u0, v0)
(iv) sRA(ui, dj,l) ≤ 1r+h+q+m+1 + 1q+m+4 < sRA(u0, v0)
(v) sRA(Pi, Pj) ≤ 1r+h+q+m+1 + 1r+|A| + 3q+m+4 < sRA(u0, v0)
(vi) sRA(Pi, aj,l) ≤ 1r+h+q+m+1 + 1r+|A| + 1q+m+4 < sRA(u0, v0)
(vii) sRA(Pi, dj,l) ≤ 1r+h+q+m+1 + 1q+m+4 < sRA(u0, v0)
(viii) sRA(ai1,j1 , ai2,j2) ≤ 1r+h+q+m+1 + 1r+|A| + 1q+m+4 < sRA(u0, v0)
(ix) sRA(ai1,j1 , di2,j2) ≤ 1r+h+q+m+1 + 1q+m+4 < sRA(u0, v0)
(x) sRA(di1,j1 , di2,j2) ≤ 1r+h+q+m+1 + 1q+m+4 < sRA(u0, v0)
This concludes the proof of Lemma 1.
Having defined the Γ(c, P ) network, and having proven the correctness of Lemma 1, we are now ready to
move to the proof of Theorem 1.
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Before we present our proof, let us first explain the intuition behind it. Specifically, the proof is based on
a reduction from the NP-complete 3-Set Cover problem to a particular instance of our problem of Evading
Link Prediction. Recall that the 3-Set Cover problem is defined by (i) a universe U = {u1, . . . , ul}; (ii) a
collection of subsets P = {P1, . . . , Pm} such that ∀jPj ⊂ U and ∀j |Pj | = 3; and (iii) an integer k ≤ m. The
goal is then to determine whether there exist k elements of P the union of which equals U . In our proof, the
3-Set Cover problem will be reduced to the problem of Evading Link Prediction (see Definition 1) where:
• the network under consideration is: G = Γ(c, P ), where c ∈ N satisfies the conditions in Lemma 1;
• the set of non-edges to be hidden is: H = {(u0, v0)};
• the set of edges that can be added is: Â = {(Pi, v0) : Pi ∈ P};
• the set of edges that can be removed is: R̂ = ∅;
• the budget that specifies the number of edges that can be modified (i.e., added or removed) is: b = k.
Note that the above instance of the problem of Evading Link Prediction is exactly the same as the instance
considered in Lemma 1. We already know from this lemma that, in the similarity-based ranking of all non-
edges in Γ(c, P ), the position of (u0, v0) is the same as that of any non-edge of the form (ui, v0). However,
after adding some edges, A ⊆ Â, the position of (u0, v0) becomes lower than that of any (ui, v0) such that
∃Pj ∈ A : ui ∈ Pj . As for the remaining non-edges, their relative ranking compared to that of (u0, v0)
remains unchanged after the addition of A. Based on this, in order to decrease the position of (u0, v0) in the
similarity-based ranking as much as possible, we need to add some edges, A ⊆ Â, such that: ∃Pj ∈ A : ui ∈ Pj
for every ui ∈ U . That is, we need to find a subset of P that covers all the elements in U , which leads us to
the 3-Set Cover problem.
Proof. The problem of Evading Link Prediction is trivially in NP, since computing AUC and AP before and
after the addition of a given set of edges A ⊆ Â and the removal of a given set of edges R ⊆ R̂ can be done
in polynomial time for every similarity index in S.
Next, we will prove that the problem is NP-hard. To this end, we will give a reduction from the NP-
complete 3-Set Cover problem. This problem is defined by (i) a universe U = {u1, . . . , ul}; (ii) a collection
of subsets P = {P1, . . . , Pm} such that ∀jPj ⊂ U and ∀j |Pj | = 3; and (iii) an integer k ≤ m. The goal is
then to determine whether there exist k elements of P the union of which equals U .
Let us assume that m ≥ 5, as all other cases can be easily solved in polynomial time. Now, for any
given similarity index, s ∈ S, consider the following instance of the problem of Evading Link Prediction
(G, s, f,H, b, Â, R̂), where:
• G = (V,E) = Γ(c, P ), where c ∈ N is chosen to be a constant that satisfies the conditions in Lemma 1
(the lemma states that such a constant exists);
• s is the similarity index under consideration;
• f is either the AUC or the AP metric;
• H = {(u0, v0)};
• b = k, where k is the parameter of the 3-Set Cover problem, and the goal is to determine whether there
exist k elements of P the union of which equals U ;
• Â = {(Pi, v0) : Pi ∈ P};
• R̂ = ∅.
Let us also introduce the following notation:
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• Υ<(G) = {e ∈ E¯ : s(e) < s(u0, v0)} in network G = (V,E);
• Υ=(G) = {e ∈ E¯ \ {(u0, v0)} : s(e) = s(u0, v0)} in network G = (V,E);
• Υ>(G) = {e ∈ E¯ : s(e) > s(u0, v0)} in network G = (V,E).
Note that E¯ is the set of non-edges in G = (V,E), whereas E¯ \A is the set of non-edges in (V,E ∪A). For
every network G′ = (V,E ∪A) : A ⊆ Â, we know from the definition of AUC in Section B that:
AUC (E ∪A,H) = |Υ
<(G′)|+ 12 |Υ=(G′)|
|E¯ \A| − 1 . (1)
We also know from the definition of AP in Section B that:
AP(E ∪A,H) = 1|Υ>(G′)|+ 1 + 12 |Υ=(G′)|
. (2)
Now, let UA = {ui : ∃Pj∈PAui ∈ Pj}. Point (b) of Lemma 1 implies that:
|Υ<(G′)| = |Υ<(G)| − |A|. (3)
On the other hand, point (a) of Lemma 1 implies that:
|Υ=(G′)| = |Υ=(G)| − |UA|, (4)
|Υ>(G′)| = |Υ>(G)|+ |UA|, (5)
Equations (1), (3) and (4) imply that:
AUC (E ∪A,H) = |Υ
<(G)| − |A|+ 12 (|Υ=(G)| − |UA|)
|E¯| − |A| − 1 (6)
On the other hand, equations (2) and (5) imply that:
AP(E ∪A,H) = 1|Υ>(G)|+ |UA|+ 1 + 12 (|Υ=(G)| − |UA|)
(7)
This, in turn, implies that:
AP(E ∪A,H) = 1|Υ>(G)|+ 1 + 12 (|Υ=(G)|+ |UA|)
. (8)
Equations (6) and (8) imply that both AUC and AP decrease with |UA|. Thus, for each of these two metrics
an optimal choice of A is one that maximizes |UA|. This happens when UA = U . For any choice of A
such that UA = U , the following holds: ∀uj∈U∃(Pi,v0)∈Auj ∈ Pi. Such an optimal choice of A constitutes a
solution to our instance of the problem of Evading Link Prediction. It also corresponds directly to a solution
to the 3-Set Cover problem.
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D Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. From the definitions of G and G′, we know that:
• dG′(x) = dG(x);
• dG′(w) = dG(w)− 1;
• |NG′(x,w)| = |NG(x,w)| − 1;
• ∀u ∈ NG′(x,w) : dG′(u) = dG(u).
With these facts in mind, we will now handle each similarity index in S separately. In particular:
• For sCN(x,w) = |N(x,w)|, we know that sCNG′ (x,w) < sCNG (x,w) because |NG′(x,w)| = |NG(x,w)| − 1.
• For sSal(x,w) = |N(x,w)|√
d(x)d(w)
, to prove that sSalG′ (x,w) ≤ sSalG (x,w), it suffices to prove that:
|NG(x,w)| − 1√
dG(x)(dG(w)− 1)
≤ |NG(x,w)|√
dG(x)dG(w)
This holds if and only if: |NG(x,w)|2 ≤ dG(w)(2|NG(x,w)| − 1). This, in turn, always holds since
|NG(x,w)| ≤ dG(w) and |NG(x,w)| ≤ 2|NG(x,w)| − 1.
• For sJac(x,w) = |N(x,w)||N(x)∪N(w)| , we know that the following holds in any network: |N(x) ∪ N(w)| =
d(x) + d(w)− |N(x,w)|. Based on this, to prove that sJacG′ (x,w) < sJacG (x,w), it suffices to note that:
|NG(x,w)| − 1
dG(x) + (dG(w)− 1)− (|NG(x,w)| − 1) <
|NG(x,w)|
dG(x) + dG(w)− |NG(x,w)|
• For sSør(x,w) = 2|N(x,w)|d(x)+d(w) , to prove that sSørG′ (x,w) ≤ sSørG (x,w), it suffices to prove that:
2|NG(x,w)| − 2
dG(x) + dG(w)− 1 ≤
2|NG(x,w)|
dG(x) + dG(w)
This holds if and only if: |NG(x,w)| ≤ dG(x) + dG(w). This, in turn, always holds since NG(x,w) ⊆
NG(x) and NG(x,w) ⊆ NG(w).
• For sHPI(x,w) = |N(x,w)|min(d(x),d(w)) , let us first consider the case where dG(x) < dG(w). In this case, we
have: min(dG(x), dG(w)) = dG(x) and min(dG′(x), dG′(w)) = min(dG(x), dG(w) − 1) = dG(x). This
implies that sHPIG′ (x,w) < s
HPI
G (x,w), since:
|NG′(x,w)|
min(dG′(x), dG′(w))
=
|NG(x,w)| − 1
dG(x)
<
|NG(x,w)|
dG(x)
=
|NG(x,w)|
min(dG(x), dG(w))
On the other hand, if dG(x) ≥ dG(w), then min(dG(x), dG(w)) = dG(w) and min(dG′(x), dG′(w)) =
min(dG(x), dG(w)− 1) = dG(w)− 1. Based on this, in order to prove that sHPIG′ (x,w) ≤ sHPIG (x,w), we
need to prove that:
|NG(x,w)| − 1
dG(w)− 1 ≤
|NG(x,w)|
dG(w)
This holds if and only if: |NG(x,w)| ≤ dG(w). This, in turn, always holds since NG(x,w) ⊆ NG(w).
27
• For sHDI(x,w) = |N(x,w)|max(d(x),d(w)) , let us first consider the case where dG(x) ≥ dG(w). In this case, we
have: max(dG(x), dG(w)) = dG(x) and max(dG′(x), dG′(w)) = max(dG(x), dG(w) − 1) = dG(x). This
implied that sHDIG′ (x,w) < s
HDI
G (x,w), since:
|NG′(x,w)|
max(dG′(x), dG′(w))
=
|NG(x,w)| − 1
dG(x)
<
|NG(x,w)|
dG(x)
=
|NG(x,w)|
max(dG(x), dG(w))
On the other hand, if dG(x) < dG(w), then max(dG(x), dG(w)) = dG(w) and max(dG′(x), dG′(w)) =
max(dG(x), dG(w)− 1) = dG(w)− 1. Based on this, in order to prove that sHDIG′ (x,w) ≤ sHDIG (x,w), we
need to prove that:
|NG(x,w)| − 1
dG(w)− 1 ≤
|NG(x,w)|
dG(w)
This holds if and only if: |NG(x,w)| ≤ dG(w). This, in turn, always holds since NG(x,w) ⊆ NG(w).
• For sLHN(x,w) = |N(x,w)|d(x)d(w) , to prove that sLHNG′ (x,w) ≤ sLHNG (x,w), it suffices to prove that:
|NG(x,w)| − 1
dG(x)(dG(w)− 1) ≤
|NG(x,w)|
dG(x)dG(w)
This holds if and only if: |NG(x,w)| ≤ dG(w). This, in turn, always holds since NG(x,w) ⊆ NG(w).
• For sAA(x,w) = ∑u∈N(x,w) 1log(d(u)) , to prove that sAAG′ (x,w) ≤ sAAG (x,w), it suffices to note that:
∑
u∈NG′ (x,w)
1
log(dG′(u))
=
 ∑
u∈NG(x,w)
1
log(dG(u))
− 1
log(dG(v))
≤
∑
u∈NG(x,w)
1
log(dG(u))
• For sRA(x,w) = ∑u∈N(x,w) 1d(u) , to prove that sRAG′ (x,w) ≤ sRAG (x,w), it suffices to note that:
∑
u∈NG′ (x,w)
1
dG′(u)
=
 ∑
u∈NG(x,w)
1
dG(u)
− 1
dG(v)
≤
∑
u∈NG(x,w)
1
dG(u)
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E The Pseudo-code of CTR
The pseudo-code of CTR is presented in Algorithm 1. Specifically, in Line 1, out of all the edges that can be
removed (i.e., all the edges in R̂), the algorithm narrows the search to only the subset R′ ⊆ R̂ in which every
edge has at least one end that belongs to some non-edge in H. After that, in Lines 3 to 13, the algorithm
computes for every edge, (v, w) ∈ R′, a score, σ(v,w), which reflects the gain from removing (v, w) from the
network. More specifically, this score is computed by counting the number of closed triads that contain
(v, w) and two other edges, one of which is in H. The edge with the greatest gain is chosen in Line 14, and
removed from the network in Line 16. This entire process is repeated until the budget, b, runs out.
ALGORITHM 1: Closed-Triad-Removal (CTR)
Input: A network, (V,E), a budget, b ∈ N, a set of edges that can be removed, R̂ ⊆ E, and a set of non-edges
to be hidden, H ⊂ E¯.
1 R′ ←
{
(v, w) ∈ R̂ :
(
∃x∈N(v):(x,v)∈H
)
∨
(
∃x∈N(w):(x,w)∈H
)}
;
2 for i = 1, . . . , b do
3 for (v, w) ∈ R′ do
4 σ(v,w) ← 0;
5 end
6 for (x,w) ∈ H do
7 for v ∈ N(x,w) do
8 if
(
(v, w) ∈ E) ∧ ((v, x) ∈ E) then
9 if (v, w) ∈ R′ then σ(v,w) ← σ(v,w) + 1;
10 if (v, x) ∈ R′ then σ(v,x) ← σ(v,x) + 1;
11 end
12 end
13 end
14 (v∗, w∗)← arg max(v,w)∈R′ σ(v,w);
15 if σ(v∗,w∗) > 0 then
16 E ← E \ (v∗, w∗);
17 end
18 end
The complexity of such a naive implementation of CTR is O(b|H||V |). This is because for every non-edge
(x,w) ∈ H (there are |H| such edges), the algorithm updates the score of every (v, w) : v ∈ N(w) (there are
at most |V | such edges) and updates the score of every (v, x) : v ∈ N(x) (again there are at most |V | such
edges); this process is repeated b times.
Note that when |H| = ω(log(|V |)), an implementation utilizing a priority queue would be faster, with a
complexity of O(|H||V | + b|V | log(|V |)); see Algorithm 2. More specifically, this implementation utilizes a
priority queue such as, e.g., a heap [12]. Such a priority queue can be built in time O(|H||V |). The cost of all
operations of extracting an element with maximal score is then O(b log(|H||V |)), which equals O(b log(|V |)),
since |H| is at most Θ(|V |2). However, the cost of updating the scores becomes O(b|V | log(|V |)), since it
can only involve decreasing the scores (decreasing scores is realized by removing an element and adding it
with a lower score).
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ALGORITHM 2: Closed-Triad-Removal (CTR) with priority queue
Input: A network, (V,E), a budget, b ∈ N, a set of edges that can be removed, R̂ ⊆ E, and a set of non-edges to be
hidden, H ⊂ E¯.
R′ ←
{
(v, w) ∈ R̂ : (∃x ∈ N(v) : (x, v) ∈ H) ∨ (∃x ∈ N(w) : (x,w) ∈ H)};
for (v, w) ∈ R′ do
σ(v,w) ← 0;
end
for (x,w) ∈ H do
for v ∈ N(x,w) do
if
(
(v, w) ∈ E) ∧ ((v, x) ∈ E) then
if (v, w) ∈ R′ then σ(v,w) ← σ(v,w) + 1;
if (v, x) ∈ R′ then σ(v,x) ← σ(v,x) + 1;
end
end
end
for i = 1, . . . , b do
(v∗, w∗)← arg max(v,w)∈R′ σ(v,w);
if σ(v∗,w∗) > 0 then
E = E \ (v∗, w∗);
for z ∈ N(v∗) ∪N(w∗) do
if (z, v∗) ∈ H ∧ (z, w∗) ∈ R′ then σ(z,w∗) ← σ(z,w∗) − 1;
if (z, w∗) ∈ H ∧ (z, v∗) ∈ R′ then σ(z,v∗) ← σ(z,v∗) − 1;
end
end
end
30
F The Pseudo-code of OTC
The pseudo-code of OTC is presented in Algorithm 3. In Line 1, out of all the non-edges that can be added
(i.e., all the edges in Â), the algorithm narrows the search to only the subset A′ ⊆ Â in which every non-edge
has at least one end that belongs to some non-edge in H. In Lines 3 to 9, the algorithm computes for every
non-edge (v, w) ∈ A′ a score, σ(v,w), which reflects the gain from adding (v, w) to the network. Here, Lines
4 and 5 ensure that the algorithm does not increase the number of common neighbours of some non-edge
in H, whereas Line 7 counts the non-edges whose number of common neighbours will increase as a result of
adding (v, w). In Lines 10 to 12, the algorithm selects the non-edge with the highest score, and adds it to
the network if it is beneficial to do so. This entire process is repeated until the budget, b, runs out.
ALGORITHM 3: Open-Triad-Creation (OTC)
Input: A network, (V,E), a budget, b ∈ N, a set of edges that can be added, Â ⊆ E¯ \H, and a set of non-edges
to be hidden, H ⊂ E¯.
1 A′ ←
{
(v, w) ∈ Â :
(
∃u∈N(v):(u,v)∈H
)
∨
(
∃u∈N(w):(u,w)∈H
)}
;
2 for i = 1, . . . , b do
3 for (v, w) ∈ A′ do
4 if ∃ u ∈ V :
(
(v,u)∈E ∧ (w,u)∈H
)
∨
(
(w,u)∈E ∧ (v,u)∈H
)
then
5 σ(v,w) ← −∞;
6 else
7 σ(v,w) ←
∣∣(NĜ(v) ∪NĜ(w)) \NĜ(v, w)∣∣, where Ĝ = (V,E);
8 end
9 end
10 (v∗, w∗)← arg max(v,w)∈A′ σ(v,w);
11 if σ(v∗,w∗) > −∞ then
12 E ← E ∪ (v∗, w∗);
13 end
14 end
The complexity of such a naive implementation of OTC is O(b|H||V |2). In more detail, computing a score,
σ(v,w), for each non-edge, (v, w) ∈ A′, can be done in time linear in |V | for each of the |H||V | non-edges.
Searching for a non-edge in A′ with the maximal score takes b|H||V | operations. Finally, updating the scores
after adding each of the b edges can be done in time linear in |V |. Next, we will present a more efficient
implementation, the complexity of which is O(|H||V |2 + b|V | log(|V |)) when using a priority queue, and is
O(|H||V |2 + b|H||V |) without a priority queue.
Algorithm 4 presents a more efficient implementation of OTC compared to Algorithm 3. The complexity
of this implementation is O(|H||V |2 + b|H||V |). Here, the |H||V |2 term comes from computing an initial
score, σ(v,w), for each non-edge, (v, w) ∈ A′ (this can be done in time linear in |V | for each of the |H||V |
non-edges). The b|H||V | term comes from searching for a non-edge in Â with the maximal score. Finally,
updating the scores after adding each of the b edges can be done in time linear in |V |.
Notice that when |H| = ω(log(|V |)) and b = ω(|V |), an implementation utilizing a priority queue (such as,
e.g., a heap [12]) would be faster. The complexity of such an implementation is O(|H||V |2 + b|V | log(|V |)).
In more detail, a priority queue can be built in time O(|H||V |2). The cost of all operations of extracting
an element with maximal score is then O(b log(|H||V |)), which equals O(b log(|V |)), since |H| is at most
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Θ(|V |2). However, the cost of updating the scores is now O(b|V | log(|V |)), since it could involve either
increasing or decreasing the scores (decreasing scores is realized by removing an element and adding it with
a lower score).
ALGORITHM 4: A more efficient implementation of Open-Triad-Creation (OTC)
Input: A network, (V,E), a budget, b ∈ N, a set of edges that can be added, Â ⊆ E¯ \H, and a set of non-edges to
be hidden, H ⊂ E¯.
A′ ←
{
(v, w) ∈ Â : (∃u ∈ N(v) : (u, v) ∈ H) ∨ (∃u ∈ N(w) : (u,w) ∈ H)};
for (v, w) ∈ A′ do
if ∃u∈V
(
(v, u) ∈ E ∧ (w, u) ∈ H) ∨ ((w, u) ∈ E ∧ (v, u) ∈ H) then
σ(v,w) ← −∞;
else
σ(v,w) ←
∣∣(N(V,E)(v) ∪ N(V,E)(w)) \N(V,E)(v, w)∣∣;
end
end
for i = 1, . . . , b do
(v∗, w∗)← arg max(v,w)∈A′ σ(v,w);
if σ(v∗,w∗) > −∞ then
E ← E ∪ (v∗, w∗);
for u ∈ V \ {v∗, w∗} do
if (u, v∗) ∈ A′ then
if (u,w∗) ∈ H then σ(u,v∗) ← −∞;
if (u,w∗) ∈ E ∧ σ(u,v∗) > −∞ then σ(u,v∗) ← σ(u,v∗) − 1;
if (u,w∗) ∈ E¯ ∧ σ(u,v∗) > −∞ then σ(u,v∗) ← σ(u,v∗) + 1;
end
if (u,w∗) ∈ A′ then
if (u, v∗) ∈ H then σ(u,w∗) ← −∞;
if (u, v∗) ∈ E ∧ σ(u,w∗) > −∞ then σ(u,w∗) ← σ(u,w∗) − 1;
if (u, v∗) ∈ E¯ ∧ σ(u,w∗) > −∞ then σ(u,w∗) ← σ(u,w∗) + 1;
end
end
end
end
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G Illustrating the Workings of CTR on the 9/11 Terrorist Net-
work
This section illustrates the workings of the CTR heuristic on the WTC 9/11 terrorist network, where the
goal is to hide the links between Mohamed Atta—a hijacker-pilot and one of the ringleaders of the attack—
and two other hijacker-pilots, namely Marwan al-Shehhi (node “S”) and Ziad Jarrah (node “J”). As shown
in Figure 7, avoiding just a couple of contacts (the dashed links) can significantly alter the likelihood of a
network analyzer exposing the links between those hijacker-pilots.
Original network
Rankings of (A,S) and (A,J):
Common Neighbours 1 and 2
Salton 2 and 10
Jaccard 2 and 9
Sørensen 2 and 9
Hub Promoted 29 and 34
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Rankings of (A,S) and (A,J): 
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Salton 9 and 27
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After two executions of CTR
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Salton 20 and 47
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Figure 7: Executing the CTR heuristic twice on the WTC 9/11 terrorist network in order to hide the links
between Mohamed Atta—a hijacker-pilot and one of the ringleaders of the attack—and two other hijacker-
pilots, namely Marwan al-Shehhi (node “S”) and Ziad Jarrah (node “J”). The red links are the ones to be to
hidden, and the dashed links are the ones removed by the heuristic. The figure shows how the ranking of the
red links (according to different link-prediction algorithms) decreases after each execution of the heuristic.
33
H Experimental Evaluation
H.1 Networks Considered in Our Study
In our experiments, we considered both real-life networks as well as randomly-generated networks. As for
the latter ones, they were generated using the following standard models:
• Scale-free networks, generated using the Barabasi-Albert model [5]: We denote such a network by
ScaleFree(n, d), where n is the number of nodes and d is the number of links added with each node;
• Small-world networks, generated using the Watts-Strogatz model [44]: We denote every such network
by SmallWorld(n, d, p), where n is the number of nodes, d is the average degree, and p is the rewiring
probability;
• Random graphs, generated using the Erdos-Renyi model [14]: We denote every such network by
RandomGraph(n, d), with n being the number of nodes, and d being the expected average degree.
Next, we describe the real-life networks used in our experiments:
• Facebook [29]: we consider three fragments of Facebook’s social network: (i) a “small” fragment consisting
of 61 nodes and 272 edges; (ii) a “medium” fragment consisting of 333 nodes and 2,523 edges; and (iii) a
“large” fragment consisting of 786 nodes and 14,027 edges;
• Madrid terrorist network [20]—the network of terrorists behind the 2004 Madrid bombing, consisting of
70 nodes and 98 edges;
• Bali terrorist network [20]—the network of terrorists behind the 2002 Bali attack, consisting of 17 nodes
and 63 edges;
• WTC terrorist network [26]—the network of terrorists behind the 9/11 attacks, consisting of 36 nodes and
64 edges;
• Zachary’s Karate Club [45]—the social network of participants of a university karate club, consisting of
34 nodes and 78 edges;
• Les Mise´rables [25]—the network of co-occurances of characters in Victor Hugo’s novel “Les Mise´rables”,
consisting of 77 nodes and 254 edges;
• Greek blogs [46]—a network of Greek political blogs, consisting of 142 nodes and 354 edges.
Next, we summarize the results for local similarity indices given all of these networks (Figure 8), before
detailing the result for each network separately (Figures 9 to 13). After that, we do the same but for global
similarity indices, i.e., we start by summarizing the results given all of the above networks (Figure 14), and
then detail the result for each network separately (Figures 15 to 19).
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H.2 Evaluating CTR and OTC Against Local Link Prediction Algorithms
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Bali attackFacebook (large)Facebook (medium)
Facebook (small)Greek blogsKarate club
Les MiserablesMadrid bombingRandomGraph(100,10)
RandomGraph(1000,10)ScaleFree(100,3)ScaleFree(1000,3)
SmallWorld(100,10,.25)SmallWorld(1000,10,.25)WTC 9/11
Figure 8: Given different local similarity indices, the figure depicts the relative change in AUC (the area
under the ROC curve) and AP (the average precision) after running OTC and CTR in different networks,
where |H| = max(10, |E|/100) and b = 4|H|, and the links in H are chosen at random. For each similarity
index, the height of the corresponding bar represents the average change taken over all networks, and the
height of each segment in that bar is proportional to the change within the corresponding network.
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Figure 9: Given different local similarity indices, the figure depicts the values of AUC (the area un-
der the ROC curve) and AP (the average precision) during the execution of OTC and CTR given
|H| = max(10, |E|/100) and b = 4|H| in three networks: (i) the WTC 9/11 terrorist network; (ii)
ScaleFree(100,3); and (iii) a medium fragment of Facebook. In each execution, the links in H are
chosen at random. Results are taken as the average over 50 executions, with coloured areas representing the
95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 10: Given different local similarity indices, the figure depicts the values of AUC (the area under
the ROC curve) and AP (the average precision) during the execution of OTC and CTR given |H| =
max(10, |E|/100) and b = 4|H| in three networks: (i) ScaleFree(1000,3); (ii) RandomGraph(100,10);
and (iii) RandomGraph(1000,10). In each execution, the links in H are chosen at random. Results are
taken as the average over 50 executions, with coloured areas representing the 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 11: Given different local similarity indices, the figure depicts the values of AUC (the area
under the ROC curve) and AP (the average precision) during the execution of OTC and CTR given
|H| = max(10, |E|/100) and b = 4|H| in three networks: (i) SmallWorld(100,10,0.25); (ii) Small-
World(1000,10,0.25); and (iii) Les Mise´rables network. In each execution, the links in H are chosen
at random. Results are taken as the average over 50 executions, with coloured areas representing the 95%
confidence intervals.
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Figure 12: Given different local similarity indices, the figure depicts the values of AUC (the area under
the ROC curve) and AP (the average precision) during the execution of OTC and CTR given |H| =
max(10, |E|/100) and b = 4|H| in three networks: (i) a small fragment of Facebook; (ii) a large
fragment of Facebook; and (iii) the Zachary karate club network. In each execution, the links in H
are chosen at random. Results are taken as the average over 50 executions, with coloured areas representing
the 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 13: Given different local similarity indices, the figure depicts the values of AUC (the area under
the ROC curve) and AP (the average precision) during the execution of OTC and CTR given |H| =
max(10, |E|/100) and b = 4|H| in three networks: (i) the Bali-attack network; (ii) the Madrid-bombing
network; and (iii) the Greek political blog network. In each execution, the links in H are chosen at
random. Results are taken as the average over 50 executions, with coloured areas representing the 95%
confidence intervals.
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H.3 Evaluating CTR and OTC Against Global Link Prediction Algorithms
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Figure 14: Given different global similarity indices, the figure depicts the relative change in AUC (the area
under the ROC curve) and AP (the average precision) after running OTC and CTR in different networks,
where |H| = max(10, |E|/100) and b = 4|H|, and the links in H are chosen at random. For each similarity
index, the height of the corresponding bar represents the average change taken over all networks, and the
height of each segment in that bar is proportional to the change within the corresponding network.
41
WTC 9/11 network ScaleFree(100, 3) Facebook (medium)
A
U
C
v
a
lu
es
fo
r
O
T
C
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Completion
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Completion
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Completion
A
U
C
v
a
lu
es
fo
r
C
T
R
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Completion
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Completion
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Completion
A
P
v
a
lu
es
fo
r
O
T
C
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Completion
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Completion
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Completion
A
P
v
a
lu
es
fo
r
C
T
R
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Completion
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Completion
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Completion
Average Commute Time
Cosine
Katz
Leicht-Holme-Newman Global
Matrix Forest
Random Walk With Restart
SimRank
Figure 15: Given different global similarity indices, the figure depicts the values of AUC (the area under
the ROC curve) and AP (the average precision) during the execution of OTC and CTR given |H| =
max(10, |E|/100) and b = 4|H| in three networks: (i) the WTC 9/11 network; (ii) ScaleFree(100,3);
and (iii) a medium fragment of Facebook. In each execution, the links in H are chosen at random.
Results are taken as the average over 50 executions, with coloured areas representing the 95% confidence
intervals.
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Figure 16: Given different global similarity indices, the figure depicts the values of AUC (the area under
the ROC curve) and AP (the average precision) during the execution of OTC and CTR given |H| =
max(10, |E|/100) and b = 4|H| in three networks: (i) ScaleFree(1000,3); (ii) RandomGraph(100,10);
and (iii) RandomGraph(1000,10). In each execution, the links in H are chosen at random. Results are
taken as the average over 50 executions, with coloured areas representing the 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 17: Given different global similarity indices, the figure depicts the values of AUC (the area
under the ROC curve) and AP (the average precision) during the execution of OTC and CTR given
|H| = max(10, |E|/100) and b = 4|H| in three networks: (i) SmallWorld(100,10,0.25); (ii) Small-
World(1000,10,0.25); and (iii) Les Mise´rables network. In each execution, the links in H are chosen
at random. Results are taken as the average over 50 executions, with coloured areas representing the 95%
confidence intervals.
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Figure 18: Given different global similarity indices, the figure depicts the values of AUC (the area under
the ROC curve) and AP (the average precision) during the execution of OTC and CTR given |H| =
max(10, |E|/100) and b = 4|H| in three networks: (i) A small fragment of Facebook; (ii) a large
fragment of Facebook; and (iii) the Zachary Karate club network. In each execution, the links in H
are chosen at random. Results are taken as the average over 50 executions, with coloured areas representing
the 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 19: Given different global similarity indices, the figure depicts the values of AUC (the area under
the ROC curve) and AP (the average precision) during the execution of OTC and CTR given |H| =
max(10, |E|/100) and b = 4|H| in three networks: (i) the Bali-attack network; (ii) the Madrid-bombing
network; and (iii) the Greek political blogs network. In each execution, the links in H are chosen
at random. Results are taken as the average over 50 executions, with coloured areas representing the 95%
confidence intervals.
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H.4 A Practical Telecommunication Scenario
In the main article, we evaluated OCT and CTR given a budget of 10 and a single link to hide in a telecom-
munication network consisting of 248, 763 nodes and 829, 725 edges. The nodes of that network corresponded
to all the users of a particular service provider—Telefo´nica Spain—who live in four geographically continuous
districts in the UK, and the links corresponded to all the calls between those users (see Figure 5 in the main
article). In this section, we consider a smaller telecommunication network consisting of 56, 073 nodes and
174, 608 links, where the nodes correspond to all users living in just a single district in the UK, and the links
correspond to all the calls between those users. The results depicted in Figure 20 exhibit similar trends to
those presented in Figure 5, i.e., CTR is effective in terms of both AP and AUC , while OTC is less effective
in terms of AP and not effective at all in terms of AUC ; mixing the two heuristics does not seem to produce
any synergistic effects.
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Figure 20: Given different local similarity indices, and a telecommunication network consisting of 56, 073
nodes and 174, 608 edges, the figure depicts the average AUC and AP during the execution of OTC and CTR
given a budget b = 10, where H contains just a single link to be hidden. More specifically, for each similarity
index, we consider the 1, 000 highest-ranked links, and for each such link, (v, u), we run the heuristic once
where the evader is v and another where the evader is u. This entire process is repeated 10 times, and the
average results are reported with the coloured areas representing the 95% confidence intervals.
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I Evaluating the Runtime of CTR and OTC
In this section, we empirically evaluate how the runtime of OTC and CTR increases with the size of the
network.4 To this end, we considered three standard types of randomly-generated networks, namely (i)
Scale-free networks, (ii) Small-world networks, and (iii) Erdos-Renyi networks. For each of these networks,
we varied the number of nodes from 100 to 100, 000, and measured the runtime of OTC and CTR given 100
edges to hide, and given a budget of 400. Figure 21 depicts the average runtime taken over 50 experiments,
with the shaded areas representing 95% confidence intervals. As can be seen, CTR is significantly faster
than OTC. In fact, the runtime of CTR did not exceed 1 millisecond even when the number of nodes
reached 100, 000, regardless of the network-generation model. This shows that CTR is applicable on massive
networks. On the other hand, the runtime of OTC increases much more rapidly, and almost reaches 3
hours when the number of nodes reaches 100, 000. The figure also shows that the runtime of OTC is almost
independent of the network-generation model, unlike CTR.
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Figure 21: The average runtime (in seconds) of OTC and CTR given |H| = 100 and b = 4|H|, and given
three types of networks: (i) ScaleFree(n, 3); (ii) SmallWorld(n, 10, 0.25); and (iii) RandomGraph(n, 10), with
n varying from 100 to 100, 000.
4Runtime was measured on a modern-day PC, with an Intel Xeon E5-2697 v2 and 16GB DDR3 RAM.
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J Evaluating the Attack Tolerance of Different Link-Prediction
Algorithms
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Figure 22: Evaluating the attack tolerance of different local similarity indices against OTC (which adds
edges) and CTR (which removes edges) by measuring the relative change in AUC (the area under the ROC
curve) and AP (the average precision) while varying the number of nodes, n, in three types of networks:
(i) ScaleFree(n, d); (ii) SmallWorld(n, d, 0.25); and (iii) RandomGraph(n, d). For each n, we report the
average degree over d = 2, 4, . . . , 10. The links in H are chosen at random, where |H| = 100 and b = 4|H|.
The entire experiment is repeated 50 times and the average is reported with coloured areas representing the
95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 23: Evaluating the attack tolerance of different local similarity indices against OTC (which adds
edges) and CTR (which removes edges) by measuring the relative change in AUC (the area under the ROC
curve) and AP (the average precision) while varying the average degree, d, in three types of networks: (i)
ScaleFree(n, d); (ii) SmallWorld(n, d, 0.25); and (iii) RandomGraph(n, d). For each d, we report the average
over n = 200, 400, . . . , 1000. The links in H are chosen at random, where |H| = 100 and b = 4|H|. The
entire experiment is repeated 50 times and the average is reported with coloured areas representing the 95%
confidence intervals.
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